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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the role of the employer in workplace training, a novelty with 
respect to the literature on this topic. Taking advantage of a unique dataset on Italy, we 
study how individual employer profile and the agglomeration of employers influence 
firms‟ propensity to invest in training. Our findings show that highly educated 
employers have a greater propensity to invest in workplace training. Moreover, we are 
able to capture the effect of employers‟ human capital agglomeration on the training 
decision. We assert that such agglomeration leads to two different alternative scenarios: 
1) a poaching effect may prevail, therefore competition among employers induces less 
propensity to train workers; 2) a positive knowledge spillover effect may prevail leading 
to a greater propensity to engage in training. We test these two options discovering that 
in the Italian case, where small businesses are prominent, the first effect is stronger. 
Several econometrics issues are considered in our empirical strategy: the skewed and 
bounded nature of the training decision indicator, the endogeneity issues derived from 
the agglomeration effect as well as the cross section dependence problems affecting 
standard errors.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic literature has long recognized the key role of workplace training to foster 
technological adoption, skill upgrading of workers and, thus, to achieve productivity growth. 
The role of workplace training is further reinforced in periods of severe economic downturns, 
as a means to favour re-organization of internal labour markets and counter the negative effect 
on employment of the slowing down of the demand for firms‟ products (Brunello et al. 2007).  
Understanding the determinants of workplace training then is a fundamental issue to be 
addressed for policy makers who aim at facing the economic recessions that most European 
economies are experiencing (Brunello 2011).   
A large amount of studies on this field show that training increases with educational 
attainment of workforce and skill intensity of occupations as well as with firm size and 
innovation. This evidence however fails to account the role of employers characteristics. 
This is quite surprising, given that employers are the key decision makers for firms 
personnel and training policy (Lazear 2010). Typically, a high educated employer is expected 
to know modern management practices and ought to put more emphasis on the skill 
accumulation of its employees (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Furthermore high level 
education employers agglomeration may affect workplace training.  
  With regards to the factors affecting a firm's training decision, we consider the effect of the 
educational level of the individual employer on the training in his/her firm. The focus of our 
analysis, however, is on the effect of human capital of employers on a local level. By exploiting 
the variability across local areas corresponding to the Italian provinces (NUTS 3), we consider 
whether further effects derive from local agglomeration of employers with different 
educational levels. In particular, we focus on the possible knowledge spillovers stemming 
from the share of college graduate employers in the area, positively influencing the firms‟ 
training decision, and contrast this with the negative effect that may derive from concentration 
of more educated employers if poaching prevails.  
The paper exploits a new dataset drawn from a survey conducted in 2010, which has never 
been exploited until now in this field, collecting a rich set of information on the personal 
profile of employers and a large number of firm variables, as well as their training strategy. 
We estimate a Tobit and a Poisson model by means of an IV approach. Findings from both 
models show that the negative influence of poaching prevails so that in areas where the share 
of college graduate employers is larger, the incidence of training tends to be lower. To prove 
robustness of these results we include in the estimated equation a number of variables 
capturing the possible confounding effects of the aggregate level of human capital inside as 
well as outside the firm. Other variables controlling for the presence of innovations and the 
incidence of voluntary quits at the firm level are added. We also consider institutional factors 
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such as the share of firms that benefited from public grants provided for training and the 
presence of second-level collective bargaining in the firm. Finally, we introduce a proxy of 
local social capital. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, it attempts to 
investigate a possible specific source of agglomeration economy generated by local 
agglomeration of employers with a high level of schooling. Accordingly to this view, the 
„quality‟ of the employers may affect the amount of training investment realized by the firms 
which in turn has   an impact on the productivity in the area. 
Secondly, the richness of the dataset at our disposal enables us to insert a few largely 
unconsidered variables in the estimated equations.  Thus, our results offer new insights on the 
influence exerted by the key-characteristics of the employer and the firm and by other selected 
features of the local economy on training investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical arguments and gives 
references to previous literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and shows descriptive 
evidence. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy adopted to test the hypotheses while 
section 5 shows the results of econometric estimates. The last section offers some concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Hypotheses and previous literature  
 
The overall goal of this paper is to enlarge the set of potential determinants of training 
choices by the firms.   The individual profile of the employer is quite a neglected factor. In 
particular, his/her educational level has been proved to be a relevant factor underlying the 
performance of the firms, however, to the best of our knowledge, there are no papers focusing 
on the link between individual employer‟s education and training of his/her workforce. Doms 
et al. (2010) review a number of papers reporting associations between the employer‟s 
education and the success of the firm. Also Bugamelli et al. (2012) estimate the effects of a set 
of characteristics of entrepreneurs and management on various innovative activities. Van der 
Sluis and van Praag (2008) show a positive and significant effect of education on firm 
performance regardless of the performance measure used. This is consistent with the human 
capital theory predicting that education investment leads to benefits for the individual. Such 
benefits, in the case of entrepreneurs, do not consist only in income but also in a higher firm 
survival rate and growth.  
Even though none of these studies directly tests the association between employer‟s 
education and training, the received results suggest that such association may exist. In 
particular, it seems reasonable to expect that in a firm managed by a more educated 
entrepreneur a higher amount of resources will be devoted to training.  Thus, our first goal is 
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to provide fresh evidence of this link since our dataset, as opposed to most firm-based 
surveys, covers information on the individual profile of the employer. 
Based on this, we try to take a further step forward in the analysis to test if an effect on 
training can derive from local agglomeration of more educated employers. Indeed, the 
literature on agglomeration shows that entrepreneurs tend to locate next to one another and 
that such entrepreneurial clusters can exert relevant influences through various channels on 
the performance of firms and workers located in the area (i.e. Duranton and Puga 2003; 
Rosenthal and Strange 2004; van Praag and Versloot 2007; Henderson 2007; Acs et al. 2009).  
Thus, the second goal of this paper is to test whether such clusters do affect the firms‟ 
training choices. In particular, we assume that if employers with different schooling have a 
tendency to concentrate in specific areas, the average educational level of the employers will 
vary across areas. Then, we are interested to verify if an uncovered relationship exists between 
the share of high educated employers in an area and the firms‟ training investments. This 
analysis can represent a relevant innovation respect to the existing empirical evidence in a 
field where two different streams of literature meet, that on agglomeration and 
entrepreneurial clusters, on one hand, and that on firms training investments, on the other 
hand. 
Theoretical predictions on the influences of the educational level of the entrepreneurial 
cluster on training are not univocal. Indeed, two opposite effects can derive from it, so that it is 
an empirical matter to establish which one actually prevails. The first effect derives from 
knowledge spillovers stemming from agglomeration of highly educated employers and 
positively affecting the training investments. To this regard it can be believed that a firm 
located in an area where the level of schooling of employers is higher may benefit from more 
information and knowledge which can make training more convenient. The second effect has 
a negative sign as it has to do with poaching. As more educated employers have a higher 
propensity to train, we may expect that in areas with a higher incidence of graduated 
employers every individual firm can behave more easily as a free-rider, searching for workers 
trained by other employers. This way, the employer in that area finds it more convenient to 
take advantage of the training carried out by the other firms without incurring costs. At the 
same time, the fear that other competing employers can poach skilled workers after training, 
lowers the expected benefits of training. Moreover, skilled wages can be higher where 
employers with a higher propensity to employ skilled labour are concentrated. Even this 
argument implies that incentives to training are lessened, as profits are more compressed 
where highly educated employers are more densely concentrated. 
While poaching is a well known argument in training literature (i.e. Stevens 1996; 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Leuven 2005; Combes and Duranton 2006), the former effect 
perhaps deserves some more discussion. We assume that training is a multifaceted complex 
activity with relevant qualitative dimensions that firms cannot precisely identify before 
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training has been accomplished. From this point of view, training can be seen as a form of 
innovation. Accordingly, the selection of successful practices of training requires the 
accumulation of some experience. Furthermore, this can exacerbate asymmetric information 
between providers and buyers in the market for training services. Thus, uncertainty and lack 
of relevant information can hamper training investments. It is worth noticing that, as long as 
we regard training as a managerial practice, this view fits well with some of the insights 
provided by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), who state that the high persistence of different 
management practices across countries and firms despite their differential profitability, can be 
explained by imperfect information as firms learn from the experiences of others while 
experimenting with different practices. 
Thus, if an employer is located in an area where other firms train intensively, forming an 
entrepreneurial cluster with a high density of firms involved in training practices, he/she will 
have the possibility of gaining information and  take advantage from their experiences by 
imitating and learning from them. As long as the employer has closer social interactions with 
other employers, sharing information will be more effective. Following Henderson (2007), we 
consider that both accidental spillover and deliberate exchanges can be relevant in our context.  
Then, we assume that also the human capital of the employers in a local area matters and 
can influence the training of an individual firm. If a firm is located in an area where it can take 
advantage of information spillovers, training will be more profitable. Based on this argument, 
the aggregate education of the employers located in an area might positively affect the training 
decisions of a firm located in the same area. In our hypothesis, more educated employers 
better appreciate the potential benefits of training and are less reluctant to train. Moreover, the 
quality of the shared knowledge increases with their level of education since highly educated 
employers are more conscious about the meanings and the quality of training experimented 
and can relay this through a more careful description.  
This process of interactive learning requires some proximity between the actors involved 
(Boschma 2005). Firstly, geographical proximity is required as, when tacit knowledge is 
considered, knowledge spreads through co-location and face-to-face relationships (Acs et al. 
2009; Fantino et al. 2012). In our case, geographical proximity is important because the 
knowledge concerning workplace training has a relevant tacit and localized component 
concerning local providers, institutional routines, and past experiences that depend on local 
specific evolutions.  
In principle also cognitive as well as social proximity might be relevant in this context. 
Indeed, as for the former one, if actors share the same knowledge base and expertise, they may 
learn from each other more effectively (Boschma 2005). Moreover, as for the latter one, 
economic relationships are embedded in social ties which can reinforce interactive learning 
(Breschi and Lissoni 2005; Agrawal et al. 2008).  However, in this paper we focus on 
geographical proximity and take into account the possible effect of knowledge spillover by 
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measuring the aggregate educational level of the employers located in each area by the share 
of employers with a university degree, under the hypothesis that a larger agglomeration of 
highly educated employers may beget a larger positive effect on training sponsored by the 
firms in the area. 
As for the role of spillovers in Italian local economies, Guiso and Schivardi (2008) report 
evidence showing that they actually influence economic outcomes. In particular, their results 
confirm that knowledge spillovers do positively affect the average local level of total factor 
productivity. On the other hand, previous papers by Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) and 
Brunello and De Paola (2008) find that training decreases where employment density is 
higher, and conclude that possible local spillover positive effects are less strong than the 
negative effects caused by higher congestion and poaching. In an analysis based on a worker-
based dataset, Croce and Ghignoni (2012) find that the local level of schooling tends to 
increase the probability of training and interpret this result in terms of a strategy directed to 
acquire absorptive capacity in presence of knowledge spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
In order to better clarify our theoretical framework and some intricacies of our empirical 
analysis we can refer to Fig. 1. The equilibrium level of training τ for a firm is given by the 
equality of marginal benefits of training (MB) and its marginal costs (MC). Under the 
hypothesis of knowledge spillover we assume that ∂MB/∂X≥0, where X represents a measure 
of the local educational level of the employers. As a consequence, the MB curve shifts upward 
if the firm is located in an area where such level is higher, and this increases the equilibrium 
value of τ. On the other hand, if poaching is more intense where X is higher, there can also be 
∂MB/∂X≤0, causing a downward shift of the MB curve and a decrease of the equilibrium level 
of τ. Indeed, if the employer fears that competing firms can poach his/her workers after 
training, the expected benefits of training lowers. Which effect prevails cannot be predicted a 
priori, so empirical analysis is required to uncover it. The sign of the estimated coefficient of 
the variable X will reveal if poaching or knowledge spillover exerts the stronger effect.  
However, a few possible confounding effects can arise if X also affects MC. First, we must 
take into account the possibility that ∂MC/∂X≤0, which implies a downward shift of the MC 
curve. This could be the case if in areas where employers are more educated and, as a 
consequence, the overall propensity to training is higher, there is  a fiercer pressure on local 
authorities to subsidize firms‟ training expenditures. In this case, of course, an observed 
positive relationship between X and training could not be interpreted as a result of knowledge 
spillovers. In order to control for this confounding effect we include in our equation a measure 
of the incidence of external subsidy on the total training expenditure at provincial level. 
Second, to control for the tightness of the skilled labour market, we include a variable 
measuring the difficulty faced by the firm in filling their vacancies. Indeed, it seems likely that 
where X is higher, the demand for skilled labour is also higher. Whenever this makes it more 
difficult to recruit skilled workers in the market, the profitability of training increases, 
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implying ∂MB/∂X≥0. Third, as the level of education of the employers is positively associated 
to propensity to innovate, we can expect that in the local areas where X is larger, there can be 
more innovation. As a result, if training complements innovation, the benefits of training will 
be higher, implying ∂MB/∂X≥0. For this reason we include in the equation a control to 
distinguish innovating from non- innovating firms.  
 
3. Data and descriptive evidences  
 
The empirical analysis is based on the Employer and Employee Survey (RIL) conducted by 
ISFOL in 2010 on a representative sample of over 25,000 partnership and limited firms 
operating in the non-agricultural private sector.  
The RIL survey collects a rich set of information about personnel organization, industrial 
relations and other workplace characteristics. In particular, RIL survey allows to detect the 
educational level and other demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs1 along with the 
intensity of training investments and other information about firm personnel policy, industrial 
relations and productive specialization. 
Furthermore, RIL data allows to perform an updated analysis on a key and almost 
unknown feature of the Italian productive system: the behavior of partnership firms. Actually, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study based on rich information about a 
representative sample of both limited and partnership Italian firms, sampled without any 
sectorial, geographical and dimensional constraints2. Thus, this work is the first controlling for 
employer‟s schooling, voluntary dismissals, and the share of public grants provided for 
training at local level. We can also identify if the firm has introduced some innovations in the 
production process and in which firms decentralized negotiations on wages take place. 
 
Given the focus of the paper, the empirical analysis is limited to firms with more than five 
employees to guarantee a minimum level of organizational structure. Moreover, the sample is 
                                                          
1  As “entrepreneur” we mean the individual who exercises the direct management of the firm (Isfol_RIL 
questionnaire, Section I). 
2  The RIL Survey sample is stratified by size, sector, geographic area and legal form of firms. The sample 
design of the RIL involves the use of variable probability of inclusion in the sample, where the range of inclusion 
depends on firm size, measured by the total number of employees. This choice has required the construction of a 
“direct estimator”, able to take account of the different probability of inclusion among the firms belonging to a 
specific stratum. In particular the direct estimator is defined for each sample unit (firm) as the inverse of the 
probability of inclusion in the sample. The estimates obtained without the use of the direct estimator are 
therefore biased as large firms are over-represented with respect to their effective incidence in the reference 
population, having a probability of inclusion in the sample higher than that associated with small firms. 
Furthermore, the direct estimator has been modified by suitable calibration techniques, obtaining a final 
estimator calibrated according to a set of constraints. Thus, this estimator is able to reproduce, through the RIL 
sample, the total of active firms for each stratum and, simultaneously, the total number of employees in the same 
stratum (size, sector, etc..). 
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restricted to those firms with no missing data on the key-variables, so that the final sample 
over which the analysis is performed counts about 7,000 firms. 
 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Tab. 1 displays the weighted descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis. To begin with, it appears evident a limited diffusion of the employers‟ 
human capital: on average, no more than 24% of firms are managed by an employer with a 
university degree, 50% of them are managed by employers with an upper secondary level of 
education while 23% has an employer with lower secondary education. Such an evidence may 
be related to the significant incidence of partnership and family-owned firms in Italy. 
Actually, the management of these firms is expected to require less formal education and skills 
than those used in limited and market-owned firms, which are typically associated to complex 
organizational and business structure (Bandiera et al. 2011; Lazear, 2010).  
Similarly, the human capital of the workforce is quite limited in our sample, coherently 
with what was previously found about the weakness of labour demand for qualified workers 
in Italy (Naticchioni et al. 2010).  In particular, the share of employees with a tertiary degree is 
only 8% while the share of employees with upper secondary and lower secondary education 
are 48% and 49%, respectively.  
Furthermore, the share of employees who have attended a training course organized by 
firms is only 19% on average, a result in line with both the low propensity of Italian firms to 
invest in formal training and the positive complementary between training investment and 
schooling at the workplace (Colombo and Stanca 2008; Brunello 2001). In addition, the 
incidence of external subsidies on total training expenditure is less than 4%. 
Tab. 1 also reports that the composition of the workforce is significantly biased against 
females (36%) and that the incidence of voluntary quits is low although quite differentiated by 
firms. As for other sample characteristics, a decentralized bargaining scheme is adopted by 7% 
of the firms and over 30% of them have invested in innovation over the period 2007-2010. 
Moreover, firms are predominantly localized in Northern regions and are small in size: 69% of 
firms employ less than 15 workers while only 1% of them employ more than 250 workers. As 
for sectoral activity, we observe that partnership and limited firms in Italy are mainly 
specialized in manufacturing (27%), in construction (13%) and in retail and the wholesale 
sector (19%). Conversely, there emerges a limited presence in highly human-capital-intensive 
service sectors: financial intermediation and insurance (1%), information, communication and 
other business services (7%) and health, education and private social services (2%). 
As far as our key aggregate variables are concerned, Tab. 1 indicates that the incidence of 
firms managed by an employer with a tertiary degree calculated by province on RIL data is on 
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average 27.8%, even though the geographical distribution of this variable is extremely 
differentiated by province, ranging between 11% in Brindisi and 51% in Milan. Finally, the 
percentage of tertiary graduates of the population aged 15-64, was calculated at province level 
on 2001 Census data. This variable has an average value of 4% and a very low variation 
between Italian provinces, underlying a sort of temporal and spatial inertia of schooling 
attainments in Italy.   
Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b integrate the picture shown by Tab. 1, reporting the relationship between 
our variables of interest. Fig. 2a describes an almost negligible positive correlation between the 
share of employers with a tertiary degree by province and the share of workers in training by 
province. Fig. 2b shows similar evidence but it is based on the share of employers with a 
tertiary degree and the percentage of training firms by province  
 
4. Econometric strategy 
 
The econometric analysis about the relations between the workplace training and 
employers‟ education is performed by estimating the following equation:  
 
(1)     iiipii FWDTDETW         
 
where the dependent variable TWi is the share of trained workers in firm i, TDEi is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the employer of firm i is tertiary graduated and Dp it is 
the number of tertiary educated employers in the province p on the population (aged 15-64) in 
province p, that is our indicator of entrepreneurial human capital agglomeration. The vector 
Wi contains workforce characteristics in firm i, Fi is a vector containing firms characteristics 
and i  is an idiosyncratic error term3.  
We use Tobit and Poisson regression models to estimate different specifications of equation 
(1). The dependent variable TWi is a fractional skewed variable with a high number of 
observations equal to zero. It is worth to notice that Poisson regression assumes generically 
E[Y|X]=exp(Xβ) to get a consistent estimate of β, so it is appropriate for a wide variety of 
models where the dependent variable is nonnegative (zero or positive), not just where the 
dependent variable measures counts of events. Moreover, recent literature (Brock and Durlauf 
2007) highlights that linear models are not able to identify social interaction parameters. In this 
case, the use of non-linear estimates (as Tobit and Poisson models) supports model‟s 
identification.  
                                                          
3  Note that we preferred to estimate a model whose independent variable is the percentage of employees 
trained instead of a dichotomous training model. Indeed the binary choice “do training- do not training” may be 
dictated by legal requirements, rather than a business decision, and could involve very few employees for a very 
small number of hours. 
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In this framework, we assume the event in which no workers received training (TWi=0) as 
the revealed employer preference for no training.  Then no selection on observables has to be 
made in order to adjust our data and model such as Heckman or the like are not needed. This 
is perfectly in line with the line of reasoning provided by Angrist and Pischke (2009).  
However, a potential problem with standard Tobit and Poisson estimates of equation (1) is 
the presence of endogeneity issues.  
In particular, if there are unobservable factors influencing both the average incidence of 
employers with a tertiary level of education in province p and firms‟ propensity to train, Tobit 
and Poisson estimates would suffer from an omitted variable bias. This happens when highly 
educated employers tend to be agglomerated in areas characterized by high quality 
management practices, technological investments and cooperative industrial relations (that are 
more favorable to workplace training). In this case, the estimated correlation between Dp and 
firms‟ training might reflect the effect of unobserved characteristics rather than the real effect 
of agglomeration. 
To deal with this problem, a large set of variables that capture firms‟ and workers‟ 
observable and unobservable characteristics is included, and different econometric 
specifications of Eq. 1 are provided. 
Moreover we take into account the potential reverse causality deriving from the non-
random localization of the employers (employers with certain characteristics may select 
themselves in particular areas). This is a key element to test for the poaching vs knowledge 
spillover hypothesis, as motivated in the previous theoretical section.  
 To address this issue we adopt an instrumental variable approach. The instrument Zp is the 
lagged share of individuals with a tertiary degree in province p over the total provincial 
population (as obtained from Census data in 2001). The rationale behind this choice is that 
tertiary graduate employers can appear with more probability where other tertiary graduates 
are located, therefore using Zp we are able to catch out this sort of “network effect” from the 
variance of Dp. A similar strategy is advised in Combes et al. (2011) where they aim at 
identifying spillover effects in agglomeration economies. 
Indeed, human capital endowments found in the local markets in 2001 are persistent over 
time and are associated with the current employers schooling level. In other words, a large 
share of graduates in 2001 predicts a higher probability of finding a highly educated employer 
in firms operating in the same area ten years later. Conversely, the province share of 
individuals with a tertiary level of schooling in 2001 is unlikely to be correlated with the share 
of trained workers in firm i operating in the same area in the year 2010. This is because the 
share of trained workers is typically affected by the exogenous process of labour market policy 
and economic conditions and it is significantly variable over time (Brunello et al. 2007).  
It is worth mentioning something on the identification of the coefficients of our key 
variable. Dp coefficient can identify only that an agglomeration effect is at work and describes 
12 
 
if the poaching effect prevails on the spillover effect (or viceversa). Intuitively, the Dp 
coefficient jointly identifies the two effects. It is impossible to disentangle the two effects in our 
micro-econometric setting. Therefore, we can test if one (and which) of the two effects prevails 
and, in line with Brunello & Gambarotto 2007, Brunello & De Paola 2007, we consider a non 
significant result as an indication that the two opposite effects have a similar magnitude.  
As already mentioned we test if an employer with a tertiary level of education has a greater 
propensity to invest in workplace training. In doing so, we estimate the effect of employers‟ 
individual level of education TDEi on workplace training. This is important in order to identify 
Dp coefficient too. In fact, if we believe that agglomerated human capital can affect the 
propensity to invest in workplace training, we expect that the estimates confirm that 
individual employer‟s education also matters. Intuitively, individual human capital is the 
channel through which the agglomeration effect comes up, therefore it is the engine that let 
the agglomeration effect work out. Thus, if the coefficient of TDEi is significant, then Dp 
coefficient can be significant, while a different result should seem very counterintuitive. To 
put it differently, we can infer that a significant estimated coefficient for TDEi is a necessary 
condition to identify a significant Dp coefficient.  
    
5. Estimation Results  
 
 The richness of our dataset allows to control for different employer and firm specific 
variables which may be seen as confounding factors that can move the exogenous choices of 
the employer. Most of the related literature in the field dealing with workplace training is 
unable to perform this kind of controls while usual estimations suffer from omitted variable 
bias problems. 
 Tables 2 and 3 respectively show the Tobit and Poisson estimates of different specifications 
of equation (1). In particular our baseline model only includes employers‟ characteristics: the 
variable of employers human capital agglomeration Dp and two dummies that formalize the 
maximum level of the employer‟s education: tertiary (TDEi), upper secondary (USDEi) and 
lower secondary (omitted category).  
From column 1 of Table 2 and 3 it emerges that both TDEi and USDEi are positive and 
strongly significant, meaning that a better educated employer provides workplace training to 
a larger share of his/her workforce. Also Dp appears to be positive and significant both in the 
Tobit and in the Poisson regression. Thus, the first evidence emerging from our estimates is 
that density exerts a positive effect on training, which is consistent with the idea of knowledge 
spillovers.  
To verify further this result, column 2 of Table 2 and 3 shows the Tobit and Poisson 
estimates of equation (1) when we control for other workforce and firms characteristics too. As 
for workforce composition, we consider the human capital endowments of workers (the 
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percentage of workers with a tertiary or an upper secondary education, respectively: %tert_edu 
and %upsec_edu), the share of female (%female) and the share of voluntary dismissals (quit 
rate)4. As for firm characteristics, we take into account a dummy for the adoption of innovation 
in the production process during the last 3 years (innov_proc), a dummy pointing out if a 
decentralized bargaining occurs at the firm level (firm_level_barg), and the share of firms that 
benefited from public grants provided for training in the province (share_finpub). Further we 
included in the equation the percentage of the population of the province holding a tertiary 
degree in 2009 (%tert_edu_prov) drawn from ISTAT data in order to take into account the effect 
of local human capital. 
This broader specification of equation (1) confirms previous results about the positive effect 
of the individual level education and the existence of spillovers associated with agglomeration 
of highly educated employers. Indeed, column 2 of Table 3 and 4 makes it apparent that the 
positive relation between the human capital of employers and workplace training is not 
significantly affected by the inclusion of workforce composition, labour turnover, incidence of 
public subsidies and firms' attitudes towards innovation and industrial relation. In particular, 
these findings show that in firms with a higher share of workers with a tertiary or a upper 
secondary educational level, a larger portion of the workforce is involved in training. This 
result can be the consequence of the well-known “complementarity effect”, according to which 
firms are more likely to train well educated workers (Brunello, 2001; Riphahn and 
Trübswetter, 2007). Conversely, we do not find any significant effect of the workforce 
composition by gender. As expected, both Tobit and Poisson estimates indicate that firm-
sponsored training investments are depressed by voluntary quits. At the same time, the local 
availability of public grants supporting training activities are positively associated to the 
incidence of training in a firm located in the area. Neither estimate finds any significant 
influence of the share of population in the province with a tertiary degree (%tert_edu_prov) on 
our dependent variable. On the contrary, the share of trained employees is strongly and 
positively affected by the occurrence of process innovations in the firm which appears to be an 
outstanding factor in increasing the share of workers in training. This result points out that 
employers view training as a complement of innovation.  
A further relevant factor exerting a positive influence on training relates to industrial 
relations. The coefficient of firm_level_barg is positive and statistically significant meaning that 
the incidence of training tends to be larger in firms where a firm-level bargaining occurs. This 
result suggests that in workplaces where the unions and the employer make collective 
agreements, more attention is devoted to the participation in training of a larger portion of the 
workforce. Indeed the development of organizational structures that foster trade unions‟ 
                                                          
4  We adopt this measure with  caution as it only applies to the same year the training measure refers 
to, which is also a year of macroeconomic downturn due to economic global crisis, so that voluntary 
separations could be underrepresented. 
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cooperation inside the firm can favour employer-provided training. In this regard, economic 
theory has traditionally shown that training provided at firm level is expected to encourage 
workers and firms to bargain over the expected returns of firm specific skills accumulation 
(Hashimoto, 1982). Recent empirical evidence for Italy confirms these theoretical predictions 
showing a positive relationship between firm level bargaining and training investment 
(Damiani and Ricci, 2012). Our result is coherent with this explanation. In particular, the 
presence of unions and the adoption of firm level bargaining increase the share of the trained 
as they play a role in helping employees to protect the quasi-rents generated by job-related 
training and human capital investments. Indeed, ample divergences may be found in 
beneficial effects of training since, in some cases, the magnitude of wage gains is only half that 
on productivity, as shown by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005). Thus firm wage 
agreements may lower the divergences between the overall gains of workplace training. In 
addition, it is worth recalling also that, according to specific regulations, the unions consent 
may represent a requirement to apply for public subsidies for training.  
The results concerning our density variable change markedly if firm size, sector of activity 
and geographical areas are also considered. As reported by columns 3 of Tables 2 and 3, the Dp 
does not play a role any longer in predicting workplace training, while the sign and the 
statistical significance of the employer‟s education, as well as of the other variables, are not 
affected. Thus, the spillover hypothesis seems to fail when equation (1) is estimated by 
including a comprehensive set of variables in order to control for the role of unobserved 
heterogeneity in firms‟ training policy. The dummies for different firm sizes are positive and 
statically significant showing that the percentage of trained workers increases with the total 
number of firm employees.  
As a further control, in our equation we add the percentage of voters in the 2001 
referendum on Title V of the Italian Constitution (ref_2001) as a proxy for local social capital. 
Indeed, in principle interactions between entrepreneurs can be influenced by the quality of 
social relationships prevailing at local level. As social capital should measure “the ability of 
people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama 1995, 
p. 10), it may represent a factor fostering the spread of information and cooperation which, in 
turn, favor knowledge spillovers. Accordingly, the inclusion of such a measure could help us 
to single out the relative strength of knowledge spillovers and poaching effects but, as a matter 
of fact, it does not bring about any change in our results.   
Tobit regression is presented with (Table 2, cols. 4 and 5) and without (Table 2, cols. 1-3) 
bootstrapped cluster standard errors and proves the robustness of our results. 
However the results shown in Tables 2 and 3 cannot be taken as conclusive as both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the Tobit and Poisson estimates may depend crucially 
on the endogeneity issue mentioned earlier.    
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5.1 Instrumental variable estimates  
 
In this section we use an instrumental variable approach to identify a causal impact of the 
“agglomeration effect” Dp. In particular, Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator can be 
invoked for this particular situation (Newey 1987). This is an efficient two step procedure in 
which general results on asymptotic efficiency of two-stage and Amemiya GLS (Amemiya 
1979, 1981, 1983) estimators are used to obtain a simple, asymptotically efficient estimator of 
the structural coefficients. In particular this estimator can be calculated by applying GLS to 
estimates of the reduced form coefficients that are obtained by using reduced form residuals 
as additional explanatory variables. Using block bootstrap method we are able to compute 
provincial clustered standard errors for this type of model. This is needed in our case because 
we have to deal with an agglomeration effect and therefore we should relax the assumption 
that observations are i.i.d. (Combes et al. 2011). In addition, we implement a second method, 
which is a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Poisson regression (Mullahy 
1997) that allows endogenous variables to be instrumented by excluded instruments 
The results of the instrumental variable regression of equation (1) are displayed in Tables 4 
and 5. For sake of simplicity, we do not report first stage regressions that show Z (the 
percentage of population with at least a tertiary degree in 2001, by province) to be always 
strongly significant and F stats greater than 10 for all the models.  
As shown by Tables 4 and 5 the instrumental variable estimates of Dp vary with the 
inclusion in the equation (1) of an increasing number of control variables. Indeed our estimates 
show that Dp turns out to be negative in both regressions and even highly significant in the 
Poisson regression (Table 5, cols. 3 and 4). Then, when we instrument the density variable, we 
unearth that knowledge spillovers and poaching effects can counteract each other and the 
latter one tends to prevail. 
The relevance of poaching effects is also brought to light by the indicator of voluntary quits 
we include in the regressions. We interpret this variable as a proxy of the incidence of 
poaching which, according to theory, is expected to depress training activities sponsored by 
the employer. As already found in the Tables above, findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 too 
confirm that voluntary quits have a strongly negative influence on the share of trained 
workers.  
As for the other covariates we do not find major deviations from previous results. In 
particular, both dummies for the employer‟s educational level, TDEi and USDEi, keep their 
positive and significant effect. As expected, also the strong and positive impact of the firm 
workforce composition by educational level is confirmed. Indeed, both the percentage of 
workers holding a university degree (%tert_edu) and the percentage of workers with an upper 
secondary level of education (%upsec_edu) contribute to significantly increase the share of 
trained workforce. Even the sizable role of process innovations and firm-level bargaining, that 
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have been discussed above, are confirmed. It is worth noticing that all our results confirm that 
the firm size is a highly influential factor, with a positive and strong effect on training 
incidence.  
Finally, after including fixed effect controls, the effect of local human capital 
(%tert_edu_prov) becomes positive and statistically significant (Table 4, cols. 4 and 5, Table 5, 
cols. 3 and 4). This variable has been included in order to capture the effects of knowledge 
spillovers generated by the education level of the population in the area. The literature has 
repeatedly highlighted the problem of endogeneity and spatial sorting affecting this variable 
(Croce and Ghignoni 2012) and we use it just as a necessary control. The result is consistent 
with the prediction that training should be more frequent in provinces where the aggregate 
educational level is higher. At the same time, the main results are not affected.  
Overall, our results show that the negative effect of poaching dominates the possible 
positive effect of knowledge spillovers. That is, when surrounded by highly educated 
employers in the same location (province) entrepreneurs are less prone to finance workplace 
training. Although, from an individual point of view, a more educated employer is likely to 
offer more training to his employees, when agglomeration of graduate employers is taken into 
account, poaching effects seem to prevail. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Based on a rich dataset covering information on the personal profile of employers and on a 
number of firm variables, as well as on their training strategies, the paper tries to shed new 
light on the factors affecting the provision of training at the workplace. The first focus of the 
analysis concerns the influence of the personal profile of the employer, namely his/her 
educational level. Secondly, we investigate if a further effect derives from local agglomeration 
of employers with different educational levels. In this regard, we test if a positive effect, 
caused by knowledge spillovers, prevails on the negative one, due to poaching. 
As for the first focus, our findings show a positive and significant effect of the employer‟s 
education. In particular, after controlling for other relevant covariates, we find that an 
employer holding a university degree tends to train a larger share of the workforce. To test the 
second hypothesis, we cope with endogeneity issues by adopting an IV strategy and include a 
number of variables to control for possible confounding effects in the estimated equations. The 
results show that, ceteris paribus, in the areas where a larger share of employers hold a 
university degree, the segment of workers receiving employer-sponsored training tends to be 
lower. Thus, we must conclude that the negative effect of poaching dominates the possible 
positive effect of knowledge spillovers.  
As for policy implications, when poaching represents a relevant issue, public subsidies 
targeted to training firms represent the standard solution to internalize the effects of training. 
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Moreover, since our results show that the lowest incidence of training mostly concerns small 
firms, special measures targeted to small businesses and greater effectiveness of the 
institutions supporting cooperative attitudes (such as training sectoral funds) ought to  be 
recommended. 
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Figure 1 - The equilibrium level of training 
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Table 1 -  Descriptive statistics (sampling weights) 
 
 
Mean  St dev Min Max 
Employer characteristics 
    tertiary education (0/1) 0.24 0.42 0 1 
secondary education (0/1) 0.53 0.50 0 1 
elementary education (0/1) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Workforce characteristics     
% trained 0.19 0.33 0 1 
% tertiary education 0.08 0.16 0 1 
% secondary education 0.43 0.30 0 1 
% primary education 0.48 0.34 0 1 
% female 0.39 0.29 0 1 
 quit rate 0.10 0.15 0 1 
Firms characteristics     
firm level bargaining (0/1) 0.07 0.26 0 1 
innovation (0/1) 0.32 0.47 0 1 
4< n. employees<15 0.68 0.47 0 1 
14< n. employees<50 0.24 0.43 0 1 
49< n. employees<250 0.07 0.25 0 1 
n. employees>249 0.01 0.11 0 1 
North Ovest 0.28 0.45 0 1 
North East 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Centre 0.22 0.41 0 1 
South 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Quarrying, Mining etc 0.00 0.04 0 1 
manufacturing 0.27 0.44 0 1 
gas, water and gas distribution 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Construction 0.13 0.34 0 1 
retail and wholesale 0.19 0.39 0 1 
trasportation  0.04 0.18 0 1 
hotels and restaurants  0.17 0.38 0 1 
insurance, monetary and financial 
intermediation  
0.01 0.10 0 1 
real estate and rental 0.05 0.23 0 1 
information, comunication and  other 
business services 
0.07 0.25 0 1 
health, education and social services 0.02 0.14 0 1 
sports, entertainment and other 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Local labour markets (province)     
% pop with tertiary education at 2001 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08 
%  of public financing 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.21 
Dp 1.84 0.96 0.27 11.85 
N of Obs  6,766 
Source: ISFOL-RIL Survey 2010 
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Figure 2.a - Employers with a tertiary degree and workers in training by Province 
 
 
Figure 2.b. - Employers with a tertiary degree and training firms by Province 
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Table 2 – Tobit estimates  (without instrumental variable) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
VARIABLES TW sigma TW sigma TW sigma TW sigma TW sigma 
           
Dp 0.019***  0.018***  -0.022  -0.022  -0.021  
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.015)  
TDE 0.344***  0.115***  0.063**  0.063**  0.064**  
 (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.030)  
USDE 0.134***  0.066**  0.054**  0.054*  0.055**  
 (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.026)  
%tert_edu   0.531***  0.259***  0.259***  0.256***  
   (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.076)  (0.062)  
%upsec_edu   0.112***  0.076**  0.076*  0.078*  
   (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.043)  
%female   -0.050  -0.086*  -0.086  -0.087*  
   (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.066)  (0.050)  
quit rate   -0.209***  -0.157***  -0.157**  -0.202***  
   (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.068)  (0.066)  
firm_level_barg   0.323***  0.218***  0.218***  0.219***  
   (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.026)  
innov_proc   0.198***  0.227***  0.227***  0.225***  
   (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.018)  
%tert_edu_prov   -0.218  -0.042  -0.042  -0.199  
   (0.328)  (0.491)  (0.571)  (0.469)  
share_finpub   1.565***  1.249***  1.249***  1.209***  
   (0.247)  (0.433)  (0.430)  (0.428)  
14< n. employees<50     0.129***  0.129***  0.126***  
     (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.020)  
49< n.employees<250     0.228***  0.228***  0.224***  
     (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.033)  
n.employees>249     0.267***  0.267***  0.263***  
     (0.042)  (0.038)  (0.033)  
ref_2001         0.002  
         (0.003)  
Sector of  economic 
activity     yes  yes  yes 
 
Macro-area     yes  yes  yes  
Region     yes  yes  yes  
Constant -0.356*** 0.825*** -0.486*** 0.690*** -0.408*** 0.658*** -0.408*** 0.658*** -0.478*** 0.657*** 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.051) (0.011) (0.098) (0.010) (0.118) (0.015) (0.151) (0.018) 
           
bootstrapped cl. SE NO  NO  NO  YES  YES  
Observations 13,733 13,733 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,766 6,766 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 – Poisson estimates (without instrumental variable) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TW TW TW TW 
          
Dp 0.025** 0.026 -0.028 -0.025 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.052) (0.052) 
TDE 0.493*** 0.181** 0.128 0.126 
 (0.053) (0.083) (0.085) (0.085) 
USDE 0.201*** 0.119 0.106 0.106 
 (0.052) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) 
%tert_edu 
 
0.852*** 0.395** 0.394** 
 
 
(0.128) (0.156) (0.157) 
%upsec_edu 
 
0.226** 0.134 0.139 
 
 
(0.097) (0.105) (0.105) 
%female 
 
-0.001 -0.112 -0.112 
 
 
(0.093) (0.124) (0.124) 
quit rate 
 
-0.431** -0.359* -0.438** 
 
 
(0.195) (0.196) (0.204) 
firm_level_barg 
 
0.450*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 
 
 
(0.058) (0.067) (0.067) 
innov_proc 
 
0.289*** 0.345*** 0.341*** 
 
 
(0.049) (0.051) (0.051) 
%tert_edu_prov 
 
-0.265 -0.032 -0.239 
 
 
(0.826) (1.318) (1.369) 
share_finpub 
 
1.719*** 1.588 1.559 
 
 
(0.619) (1.135) (1.147) 
14< n. employees<50 
  
0.141** 0.136** 
 
  
(0.062) (0.062) 
49< n.employees<250 
  
0.236*** 0.229*** 
 
  
(0.075) (0.075) 
n.employees>249 
  
0.274*** 0.267*** 
 
  
(0.102) (0.102) 
ref_2001 
   
0.003 
 
   
(0.007) 
Sector of  economic activity 
  
yes yes 
Macro-area 
  
yes yes 
Region 
  
yes yes 
Constant -1.752*** -2.095*** -2.046*** -2.110*** 
 
(0.051) (0.129) (0.269) (0.360) 
     Observations 13,733 6,795 6,795 6,766 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 –Tobit estimates with instrumental variable (second stage) 
IVTOBIT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
dependent variable TW TW TW TW TW 
      
Dp 0.059*** -0.035 -0.143* -0.143* -0.148** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.076) (0.077) (0.072) 
TDE 0.339*** 0.115*** 0.067** 0.067** 0.067** 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
USDE 0.133*** 0.064** 0.056** 0.056** 0.056** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
%tert_edu  0.519*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 
  (0.057) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) 
%upsec_edu  0.108*** 0.078** 0.078* 0.078* 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) 
%female  -0.046 -0.085* -0.085* -0.086* 
  (0.036) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050) 
quit rate  -0.253*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 
  (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) 
firm_level_barg  0.321*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
innov_proc  0.194*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
%tert_edu_prov  0.271 1.664 1.664* 1.660* 
  (0.414) (1.161) (0.970) (0.977) 
share_finpub  1.582*** 1.942*** 1.942*** 1.981*** 
  (0.249) (0.623) (0.741) (0.722) 
14< n. employees<50   0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
   (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) 
49< n.employees<250   0.224*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 
   (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) 
n.employees>249   0.272*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
   (0.042) (0.034) (0.034) 
ref_2001     0.002 
     (0.004) 
Sector of  economic 
activity   yes yes yes 
Macro-area   yes yes yes 
Region   yes yes yes 
Constant -0.433*** -0.435*** -0.456*** -0.456*** -0.513*** 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.105) (0.121) (0.156) 
bootstrapped cl. SE NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 13,667 6,766 6,766 6,766 6,766 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 –Poisson estimates with instrumental variable (second stage) 
IVPOISSON (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dependent variable TW TW TW TW 
 
     
Dp 0.063** -0.054* -0.260*** -0.252*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.079) (0.079) 
TDE 0.481*** 0.193*** 0.128* 0.126* 
 (0.040) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069) 
USDE 0.196*** 0.119** 0.153** 0.151** 
 (0.040) (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) 
%tert_edu  0.897*** 0.636*** 0.633*** 
  (0.100) (0.130) (0.130) 
%upsec_edu  0.155** 0.161* 0.161* 
  (0.079) (0.095) (0.094) 
%female  -0.069 -0.239** -0.235** 
  (0.071) (0.111) (0.111) 
quit rate  -0.515*** -0.579*** -0.583*** 
  (0.144) (0.150) (0.149) 
firm_level_barg  0.430*** 0.347*** 0.346*** 
  (0.038) (0.051) (0.051) 
innov_proc  0.306*** 0.408*** 0.412*** 
  (0.036) (0.042) (0.042) 
%tert_edu_prov  0.410 2.970** 3.246** 
  (0.640) (1.400) (1.480) 
share_finpub  1.990*** 2.415** 2.420** 
  (0.473) (1.033) (1.022) 
14< n. employees<50   0.156*** 0.159*** 
   (0.053) (0.053) 
49< n.employees<250   0.314*** 0.318*** 
   (0.062) (0.062) 
n.employees>249   0.401*** 0.398*** 
   (0.086) (0.084) 
ref_2001    -0.008 
    (0.006) 
Sector of  economic 
activity   yes yes 
Macro-area   yes yes 
Region   yes yes 
Constant -1.822*** -1.993*** -1.955*** -1.717*** 
 
(0.068) (0.115) (0.237) (0.327) 
        
 Observations 13,667 6,766 6,766 6,766 
                         Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1 - Variables definition 
Variables Definition Sources (*) 
TW Proportion of employees that have attended a training course organized by 
the firm 
(a) 
Dp Index of employers’ human capital agglomeration (a) 
TDE Dummy variable that equals 1 if an employer has a tertiary level of education, 
0 otherwise. 
(a) 
USDE Dummy variable that equals 1 if an employer has an upper secondary level of 
education, 0 otherwise  
(a) 
%tert_edu Proportion of employees with a tertiary education degree (a) 
%upsec_edu Proportion of employees with an upper secondary  education degree (a) 
%female Proportion of female employees (a) 
quit rate  Proportion of employees who quit in 2009 (a) 
firm_level_barg Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has implemented a decentralized 
scheme on wage and labour issues, 0 otherwise 
(a) 
innov_proc Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has invested in process innovation 
three years before the survey, 0 otherwise 
(a) 
%tert_edu_prov Percentage of population (15-64 years old) with a tertiary education degree 
by province, 2009 
(b) 
share_finpub Percentage of firms in the province who obtained a full or partial funding for 
training activity, on the number of firms in the province 
(a) 
Firm size  4 dummies variables for: 4< n. employees<15 (ref. cat.), 14< n. employees<50, 
49< n. employees<250, n. employees>249 
(a) 
Ref_2001  Percentage of voters in the 2001 referendum on Title V of the Italian 
Constitution 
(c) 
Sector of  
economic activity  
11 dummies variables for: Quarrying (ref. cat.), Mining etc; manufacturing; 
gas, water and gas distribution; Construction; retail and wholesale; 
transportation hotels and restaurants; insurance, monetary and financial 
intermediation ; real estate and rental; information, communication and  other 
business services; health, education and social services; sports, entertainment 
and other 
(a) 
Macro-area 4 dummies variables for: North West (ref. cat.), North East, Centre and South 
regions 
(a) 
Region 20 dummies variables for Italian regions (NUTS 2) (a) 
(*)Sources: (a) RIL- ISFOL Survey 2010; (b) ISTAT; Census data 2001;  (c) Italian Ministry of Interior. 
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